‘The independent Committee on Standards in Public Life has today announced that it will be carrying out a new review looking at accountability within public bodies and the importance of acting on early warning signs.’ 25th March 2024

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/committee-on-standards-in-public-life-launches-new-review-on-accountability-within-public-bodies

Summary

CIVIC is a group of councillors, ex-councillors and members of the public interested in supporting councillors and advocating for reform of local government. This response to the CSPL’s consultation on accountability was compiled as a result of a rapid consultation with and dialogue between CIVIC’s members. 

Accountability in town and parish councils is inadequate. The negative impact this has on councillors, staff, and parishioners is significant, and is against the public good. We have tried to summarise the flaws. They include:

• A lack of external oversight and accountability. Town and parish councils are largely self-governing.
• Inadequate oversight and accountability of individual councillors and staff.
• Disincentives for raising problems and concerns, and a lack of protections for those who do.
• Lack of understanding and insufficient training for those in the organisation. 
• Restricted access to guidance.
• ‘Groupthink’ and factionalism.
• Insufficient regulation.

We have included in this response potential reforms and solutions suggested by members. However, we believe much more needs to be done to recognise the problems and resolve them, including changes to legislation, regulation and guidance.

1. Who we are

• This submission is sent on behalf of the organisation CIVIC, the local councillors and supporters alliance.

• CIVIC is a recently formed group set up to support individual councillors in local government and to press for reform of local government law, regulation and guidance. The group has approximately 20 members. Membership is open to councillors, ex-councillors, and other members of the public with an interest supporting local councillors and in reforming local government. 

• CIVIC’s focus is local government, particularly, but not exclusively, town and parish councils. CIVIC’s membership has direct experience of some of the issues around accountability in local government. 

2. How this response was drafted

• CIVIC is a new group, started only in the last few weeks. We are still in the process of setting ourselves up. Consequently, as a group we have not had enough time to reach a settled consensus on all the issues of accountability in local government. However, it was thought was right to nevertheless submit this response to meet the consultation deadline.

• A first draft was distributed to members for comment on 29^th May. Comments were received and a second draft send out for final comments on 7^th June. The final version was submitted on 11^th June.

• For many aspects of this response, there was little disagreement voiced by CIVIC members. However, for some aspects, especially those proposing potential solutions, we as a group have not reached a settled view. We have used the phrases ‘members thought’ or ‘some members thought’ throughout to indicate where this occurred.

3. Consultation questions and answers

• We answer the consultation’s questions below. Please note that we do not address all the consultation’s questions.

4 Q1. What are the main reasons why public bodies might fail to act quickly and decisively at the first sign of a problem within the organisation?

4.1 Lack of external oversight and accountability of the organisation

4.1a Town and parish councils have little external oversight and accountability.

4.1.1 Local Government Ombudsman

4.1.1a Town and parish councils are not covered by the Local Government Ombudsman (LGO). 

4.1.2 Monitoring Officer

4.1.2a The conduct of individual councillors is covered by a code of conduct. Investigation of code of conduct complaints is carried out by the district council’s Monitoring Officer (MO). However, the sanctions that can be imposed are limited and subject to approval by the parish council. In practice, MOs have many other duties. Complaints against councillors are often filtered out as not covered by the code of conduct or beyond the MO’s remit, or, if upheld, the findings are in some cases not published. Many code breaches are resolved through ‘informal resolution’ and thus are not subject to a formal investigation. Complaints against a whole group of councillors are often not accepted by the MO. The code of conduct is designed for sanctioning individual councillors, but it is not an adequate tool for ensuring a council as a whole conducts itself properly.

4.1.3 Police

4.1.3a Serious misconduct might be reported to the police but they are often reluctant to investigate except in the most serious and blatant cases.

4.1.4 Auditors

4.1.4a Most town and parish councils are subject to annual internal and external audits. However, the scope of these audits is limited and dependent on how the auditor interprets their role. And the audit process is usually slow – a matter of several months – so it is not an appropriate tool for highlighting urgent problems. The audits result in recommendations that the council may or may not adopt. In addition, the internal auditor may also be the council’s regional Association of Local Councils (ALC), to which the council pays membership and receives advice. This is a conflict of interest.

4.1.4b Some members commented on the lack of clarity and understanding around a council’s Annual Governance and Accountability Return (AGAR), suggesting the forms mean little to the general public. It was unclear to some what matters members of the public could submit an objection on or about. As this is one of the few areas of potential accountability for councils, this is a concern.

4.1.4c In many councils the same internal auditor is used year after year, which can perpetuate practices that might be deemed questionable by a third party, and risk a too close a relationship to develop between auditor and councillors or staff.

4.1.4d The external auditors often appear overstretched. Their costs are charged back to the council, and this may discourage some from raising valid objections with them.

4.1.5 Electorate

4.1.5a It might be thought that the electorate provide the ultimate form of oversight and accountability, through elections. At the town and parish level, this is an inadequate tool. First, elections are too blunt an instrument – they occur every four years and the electorate considers many other matters, not just the conduct of the council or councillors. Second, in most cases there is no opportunity for the electorate to cast their vote anyway. Often seats are uncontested because there are too few candidates. Often vacancies are filled by co-option. In one region it is estimated that at the last election (May 2023) approximately 88% of councils had no votes cast because there were too few candidates, and approximately 88% of council seats were uncontested.

4.15b Members commented on the lack of interest in their council amongst the electorate. 

4.16 In summary, there are few effective external checks on town and parish councils. This is a concern. One member described it as ‘the wild west’.

4.2 Lack of sanction for individuals within the organisation

4.2.1 Councillors’ code of conduct

4.2.1a The inadequacy of the enforcement of the councillors’ code of conduct has been widely commented on by other organisations (such as NALC, ALCC, SLCC), and we have mentioned some of the limitations above. The lack of effective sanctions is the most often cited weakness. However, although that is a weakness, we would add that there are other flaws that, if not addressed alongside sanctions, will lead to greater injustice, and as a result hinder accountability:

1. The process of dealing with code of conduct complaints must be fair, open, consistent and just.
2. Investigations must be appropriately resourced and conducted.
3. Findings should be reached in a timely fashion.
4. The process should be subject to appeal and itself open to external scrutiny and review.
5. The scope of the code of conduct should be widened to include the whole council.
6. Compliance with sanctions should be mandatory, not at the discretion of the council.

4.2.1b We are pleased that in a few cases the LGO has investigated a MO’s handling of a complaint. But we are concerned that in many cases the LGO may exclude an investigation as outside their remit.

4.2.1c Some members reported long delays (several months, over a year) in the MO dealing with complaints.

4.2.2 Officers and staff code of conduct

4.2.2a At the town and parish level, there is often no equivalent code of conduct for council officers and staff. Staff are covered by the Nolan Principles and the law, but there is nothing more specific to guide conduct. Clerks who are members of their professional society are covered by their own code, but not all clerks are members, and the code is not open to the council or public to use. District councils and higher often have a code of conduct for officers and staff; town and parish councils should have one too, and it should be mandatory.

4.3 Poor complaints handling

4.3a The public may submit complaints about their town or parish council to the council itself (they cannot go to the LGO). Complaints may be an early sign of a problem within the organisation. For town and parish councils, however, complaints handling can have limitations:

• the council is itself responsible for approving its complaints handling process, which may itself be flawed, and there is no obligation for it have a complaints handling process at all;
• in handling complaints, the council is in effect marking its own homework. In some cases, an initial filtering of complaints is carried out by officers who may be implicated in the complaint.

4.3b Some members thought the training available to councillors and staff for handling complaints was very limited, considering the level of skill it can require.

4.4 Disincentive for the public in raising concerns

4.4a Over recent years, more councils at all levels have adopted policies designed to handle ‘persistent and vexatious’ complainers or communicators. The motivation is understandable; that there may be members of the public taking up a lot of council time with vexatious complaints. However, we are aware that some councils have adapted and amended these policies to weaken the checks and balances in them to such an extent that they can be applied to non-vexatious communications and to impose sanctions intended to be a disincentive to members of the public raising complaints of any kind. We are concerned that such policies may be used, whether deliberately or not, to avoid scrutiny and accountability.

4.5 Ineffective officer management and disciplinary process

4.5a The council’s clerk is employed by the council as a whole, not an individual councillor. Often, the management of the clerk is delegated to a staffing committee. In practice, in many cases, the management of the clerk is inadequate, either because the councillors lack knowledge or because they are reluctant to discipline the clerk. The low number of experienced clerks may be a factor.

4.5b We have experience of many councils where a controlling group of councillors protect the clerk from scrutiny and what might be an appropriate disciplinary process, and they in return can rely on the clerk to support them and do their bidding. It is a mutually beneficial dynamic, but can work against the broader interest of the council, the public interest, and hinders accountability.

4.6 Disincentive for officers raising concerns

4.6a Conversely, the clerk or other officers may feel reliant on the support of the controlling group of councillors, or at least a majority of councillors, in order to keep their job. Were a clerk to raise a concern that their employer determined was not beneficial, or a threat to their own position or reputation, the clerk may feel they put their own employment at risk.

4.7 Lack of understanding, knowledge, and training within the organisation

4.7a Councillors often have little or no training on their role and responsibilities, or on the operation and remit of the council. Training is optional.

4.7b Clerks are encouraged to achieve a relevant qualification (eg. CiLCA), but many do not and there is no minimum mandatory qualification for the role. The costs in some cases are borne by the clerk themselves.

4.7c Best practice guidance and training is often provided by the regional Association of Local Councils (ALCs).

4.8 ‘Groupthink’ culture and factionalism

4.8a The lack of oversight, checks and balances mentioned above, when combined in an organisation that at its heart runs on the views of a majority (as a council inevitably does), make the organisation extremely vulnerable to ‘groupthink’ and the marginalisation of minority views. Worse than that, it can lead to the ostracizing and discrediting of those who hold or express minority views.

4.8b CIVIC has heard of many examples where councillors were ostracized, discredited, unheard, disempowered, and blocked in their attempts to raise questions about the running of their council and to improve the level of scrutiny of the council.

4.8c Some members commented on the unavailability of mediation methods, and the lack of incentives to engage with meditation. “Once a council becomes toxic, it’s hard to turn it around”, one said.

4.8d The recently published ‘Good Councillors Guide’ from the National Association of Local Councils (NALC) crystalises this view, we believe for the first time, of the dominance of the majority to control the expression of minority councillors, when it says:

“Once a decision has been resolved by the council, councillors should stand by that decision, as a member of that council. Councillors should not use social media to criticise the council’s decision, even if they voted against it. This is because a councillor’s own personal opinion is not paramount in the collective decision-making process of a local council.”

This has obvious and concerning implications for accountability.

4.9 Lack of protection for potential whistleblowers

4.9a Whistleblowers are usually by their nature in a minority, often a very small minority. In a town or parish council, that can be a very vulnerable position, especially if you are a councillor. You are likely to find little or no support inside or outside the council. You will probably be unable to contact your regional ALC as they typically restrict access to the chair and clerk. Even if you are able to speak to them, their remit is the ‘corporate interests’ of the council, not your interests as a whistleblower or a councillor. The Monitoring Officer may not be able to help if it is not a code of conduct issue.

4.9b If you speak out, for example, saying that a council decision is in some way wrong, you may be tarnished as ‘not a good councillor’ – this is formalised in the latest NALC Good Councillors’ Guide.

4.9c You may find yourself singled out – not just ostracized, but subject to threats, abuse, and allegations of bullying, and/or of bringing the council into disrepute. 

4.9d If you are a councillor, you are likely to find you are expected to accept a certain level of what in other situations might be considered bullying or harassment. It can be difficult for a ‘whistleblower’ councillor to be sure when the line is crossed. If you are the subject of an accusation, for example, of bullying, you may wish to refer yourself to the Monitoring Officer as a way of clearing your name, only to find the MO does not accept self-referrals. 

4.9e Whistleblowers or challengers often live in the parish, and can become the target of village gossip to such an extent as to make their life within the parish untenable.

4.9f We have members who, taken together, have direct experience of all the above.

4.9g Allegations of bullying that were either not upheld or not submitted for assessment were common. Several members felt such allegations had been misused to control, threaten or punish them. We are in the process of gathering impact statements from members. But some of the experiences already recounted are shocking. 

4.9h You may find the only option is to ask for a judicial review. Very few are prepared to risk the expense.

4.9i Few town or parish council have a whistleblower policy. Whistleblower policies, where they exist, do not cover councillors or give them any protection.

4.10 Insufficient regulation

4.10a Alongside the insufficient oversight, the regulatory obligations placed on town and parish councils are inadequate. 

4.10.1 The Transparency Code

4.10.1a The Transparency Code, which could be a useful tool for facilitating accountability and oversight, is only mandatory for the very smallest councils. For most councils in the tier, it is optional.

4.10.2 Standing Orders and Financial Regulations

4.10.2a Internal governance of town and parish councils is largely covered by each council’s standing orders (SOs) and financial regulations. NALC provides model templates for both documents. 

4.10.2b However, councils can modify or amend their SOs and financial regulations to weaken governance and scrutiny. Examples mentioned by members include: the removal of a councillor’s right to ask a question in a meeting; the removal of the public forum; the requirement for prior permission to record the public meeting; inclusion of exemptions to financial regulations. In some cases, these amendments might be judged unlawful by a judicial review, but it is rare that they are challenged in this way.

4.10.2c Some members experienced a council’s disregard for its own standing orders or financial regulations. For example, retrospective approvals once significant sums are spent. New and inexperienced councillors sometimes found themselves bulldozed by confident, but wrong, experienced councillors.

4.10.3 Misuse of control of the agenda

4.10.3a The NALC model SOs give the clerk the final say on meeting agendas. This is sometimes interpreted as giving the clerk absolute discretion on what can be included and what excluded. Members reported examples of where this had been used to block motions from councillors out of favour, or avoid scrutiny and thus undermine accountability.

4.10.3b Often councils restrict the matters the public can raise during the public forum part of a meeting to only those items already on the meeting agenda. This restriction on parishioner engagement seems unnecessary and can be used by a council, chair, or clerk to avoid accountability. 

5 Q2. Can you describe any examples of practical measures used by public bodies to ensure that employees are guided by the Nolan Principles at critical decision points, including but not limited to decision-making models, codes of conduct, guidance and training?

5.1 Codes of conduct

5.1a Members generally agreed codes of conduct are beneficial, but many felt they are not sufficient on their own. They must:

1. be consistent across all councils
2. be mandatory
3. be sufficient in scope to cover all kinds of misconduct, especially groups of councillors acting improperly
4. cover officers and staff as well as councillors
5. be investigated fully and fairly, with sufficient investigatory resources
6. reach a conclusion in a timely fashion
7. have an appeals process and sufficient checks in place to avoid bias
8. be investigated and enforced by an external body given the appropriate powers to do so
9. have all decisions on breaches published
10. have sufficient sanctions to ensure compliance and deterrence

5.1b Some members called for stricter rules on conflicts of interest – including those for officers. 

5.2 Training

5.2a Several members thought compulsory training for councillors should be considered, especially for co-opted councillors, or prior to a councillor joining a council committee.

5.2b Several members thought all clerks should be obliged to achieve a suitable qualification, and be supported to do so.

5.2c One member commented that the training they had received about how a council was supposed to operate was all well and good, but it did not help if their own council was not following best practice: “Yes that is what is supposed to happen. But what happens when it doesn’t happen like that at the parish council? Because it isn’t at mine.”

5.3 Guidance

5.3a Some members thought the latest edition of the NALC Good Councillors’ Guide required revision to remove the new obligation on all ‘good’ councillors to not criticise a council decision.  Several reasons were cited: it unnecessarily restricts councillors’ freedom of expression; it may have the effect of silencing potential whistleblowers (see our answer 1.9).

5.3b Several members reported they could not access sufficient guidance. Questions to the regional ALC could only go through the council chair or clerk. Councillors were not provided with password access to online NALC resources as a matter of course. In one case, the regional ALC had restricted questions to only those supported by a majority of the council, which effectively removed all access to guidance for the minority group.

6. Q3. Public bodies are required to manage a variety of risks to the successful delivery of public services. What role can data play in understanding these risks?

6a Some members agreed data is beneficial but thought summary data that covers all the town and parish councils, even within the same region, is very limited and hard to access. This makes it hard for an individual council to use it to assess risk. (Some members thought few councillors know how to assess risk, however.)  It would be beneficial if summary data on council sizes, precept, asset amounts, policies, number of complaints, complaints upheld, audit results, etc. is gathered at the national level and made available to individual councils and the public.

7 Q4. Are you aware of any examples of organisations that have good processes in place for identifying patterns and spotting problems that need addressing?

7a Some members mentioned parishioner surveys as a useful tool for gathering feedback that could be used to identify patterns and potential problems.

7b Some members felt community engagement by town and parish councils was poor (ie., either none or an infrequent community newsletter), although others were aware of good counter-examples. 

7c Some members compared town and parish councils to other service providers, such as the NHS, and suggested they should adhere to recognised best practice and minimum standards as set by an independent auditor or regulator. Standards could be set for public facing duties, minimum staffing, communication with the electorate, handling complaints, services provided and to which resident groups, staff satisfaction, service user satisfaction, etc. This could work alongside a consistent processes data collection, analysis, and publication, implementing required actions and re-assess to address and solve problems. 

7d Some members compared town and parish councils to businesses, where, it was suggested, auditing is more much rigorous.

8 Q5. What practices and behaviours can the boards of public bodies adopt to ensure that they have proper oversight of their organisation?

8a To ensure best practice and proper oversight, all members believed regulatory reform is needed for town and parish councils. This would include:

• bringing town and parish councils within the remit of the Local Government Ombudsman;
• making the Transparency Code mandatory for all councils;
• broadening and strengthening the process for handling code of conduct issues, and ensuring it is just, open and fair;
• making a code of conduct mandatory for all council staff;
• reforming the co-option process to ensure council vacancies are not filled with ‘the right sort’ of councillors;
• restricting further how a council’s Standing Orders and Financial Regulations can be customised, amended or added to.

8b Some members felt clerks should be employed by the council the next tier up (usually the district council), rather than by the town or parish council itself. Or that the clerk should be employed by an independent third party. In either case, it would remove some of the risks of the councillor/clerk dynamics, and make it easier for clerks to voice advice that might be unpalatable. 

8c Some members thought the Standards Board should be re-introduced.

8d One member said: “There are no appraisals of the performance of parish councillors. Frequently it is self-interest that drives parishioners to volunteer as councillors.”

8e Some members felt town and parish councils are not amenable to reform, that they should be abolished and their functions taken on by district and borough councils. One member reported that the leader of their district council lamented how much time and financial resources was taken up by staff dealing with complaints about parish councils.

9 Q6. How should public sector bodies conduct their annual board effectiveness evaluations? What does best practice look like?

9a [No answer]

10 Q7. Accountability in public life can sometimes be associated with blame. How can public bodies build a culture where people feel safe to speak up about concerns, allowing problems to be addressed early and lessons to be learned?

10a See our answers 4.4 (‘Disincentive for the public in raising concerns’), 4.6 (‘Disincentive for officers and staff raising concerns’), and 4.9 (‘Lack of protection for potential whistleblowers’). Better protections for potential whistleblowers, both councillors and staff, are needed. The potential misuse of ‘persistent and vexatious communicators’ policies should be reviewed.

11 Q8. The Nolan Principles of honesty and openness require public bodies to be transparent about how they operate and the decisions they make on behalf of the public. Are you aware of any examples of organisations exhibiting good practice in this area?

11a Good, well-run town and parish councils exist. CIVIC members are concerned by the growing number that are not, and the lack of ability or willingness of the relevant bodies to acknowledge it or do anything about it.

CIVIC